HJB 방정식을 이용한 공급사슬관리 최적화 연구
SCM Optimization using HJB Equations
- 주제(키워드) Supply chain , Feedback Stackelberg equilibria , Game theory , Cooperative advertising , Online channel , Retailer channel
- 발행기관 아주대학교
- 지도교수 Byeong-Yun Chang
- 발행년도 2019
- 학위수여년월 2019. 2
- 학위명 박사
- 학과 및 전공 일반대학원 경영학과
- 실제URI http://www.dcollection.net/handler/ajou/000000028877
- 본문언어 영어
- 저작권 아주대학교 논문은 저작권에 의해 보호받습니다.
초록/요약
Channel coordination and advertising promotion strategy play very important roles in supply chains management. Most of the literature focus on one manufacturer and a single-offline-retailer. Little of the literature has focused on competitive models, and even fewer on the manufacturer directing a retailer channel and an online channel. Therefore. in this dissertation, we investigate advertising incentive strategies using HJB equations in a dynamic multi-channel where a manufacturer as a leader directs both a traditional retailer channel and an online channel based on goodwill. In the first part of studies, we research Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria in a multi-channel under non-coop, unilateral coop, and bilateral coop advertising strategy scenarios using HJB equations in a dynamic multi-channel supply chain. In the second part of studies, we build three different cooperative strategy models: a non co-op advertising model, a unilateral co-op advertising model, and a bilateral co-op advertising model with a revenue sharing contract using HJB equations in a dynamic multi-channel supply chain. Finally, we build three different green advertising incentive models using HJB equations in a dynamic multi-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC): a non co-op green advertising incentive model (NGA-Model), a unilateral co-op green advertising incentive model (CGA-Model), and a bilateral co-op green advertising incentive model (BGA-Model). For each of these three studies, the optimal price and advertising incentive decisions are obtained. Overall, the results show that the bilateral co-op advertising incentive model has better performance than the other two advertising incentive strategies.
more목차
CHAPTER 1 : Introduction 1
CHAPTER 2 : Optimal Pricing and Advertising Decision in a Dynamic Multi-Channel Supply Chain 5
2.1 Introduction 5
2.2 Literature Review 6
2.3 Methods 8
2.4 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibria 11
2.4.1 Feedback Equilibria without Advertising Support 11
2.4.2 Feedback Equilibria with Unilateral Advertising Support 14
2.4.3 Feedback Equilibria with Bilateral Advertising Support 17
2.5 Comparison of Equilibrium 19
CHAPTER 3: Optimal Cooperative Advertising Models with a Revenue Sharing Contract in a Dynamic Multi-Channel Supply Chain 24
3.1 Introduction 24
3.2 Literature Review 25
3.3 Model 27
3.4 Equilibria 30
3.4.1 Feedback Equilibria under the NR-Model 30
3.4.2 Feedback Equilibria under the CR-Model 32
3.4.3 Feedback Equilibria under the BR-Model 35
3.5 Model Comparison 37
CHAPTER 4 : Optimal Green Advertising Incentive Model in a Closed Loop Supply Chain 41
4.1 Introduction 41
4.2 Literature Review 42
4.3 Model 46
4.4 Equilibria 49
4.4.1 NGA Feedback Equilibria. 49
4.4.2 CGA Feedback Equilibria 50
4.4.3 BGA Feedback Equilibria 51
4.5 Numerical Analysis 53
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion and Future Research 58
APPENDICES 61
A.1 Proofs of Part 2 61
A.2 Proofs of Part 3 77
A.3 Proofs of Part 4 95
A.4 Source Code for Part 2 114
A.5 Source Code for Part 3 126
A.6 Source Code for Part 4 135
REFERENCES 144
