목차

Acknowledgements ii
Abstract iii
Chapter
1. Overview 1
1.1. Introduction 1
1.2. Example applications 3
1.3. Data aggregation 10
1.4. Attackers and security services 16
1.4.1. Attackers 16
1.4.1.1. Sybil attacks 16
1.4.1.2. Replay attacks 17
1.4.1.3. False data injection attacks 18
1.4.2. Security services 19
1.4.2.1. Data confidentiality 19
1.4.2.2. Data integrity 20
1.4.2.3. Data freshness 20
1.4.2.4. Authentication 21
1.5. The problem statement 21
2. Literature review 22
2.1. Securing data based on Cryptographic Techniques (CT) 23
2.2. Securing data based on Monitoring Techniques (MT) 25
2.3. Securing data based on CT-MT Hybrid 26
3. Secure Data Aggregation Protocols 27
3.1. Introduction 28
3.2. Related work 29
3.3. Assumptions 32
3.4. Basic Approach (BA) 33
3.4.1. Aggregation session 34
3.4.1.1. Query dissemination phase 34
3.4.1.2. Aggregation phase 35
3.4.1.3. Attestation phase 36
3.4.2. Security analysis 38
3.4.2.1. Finding the attack node 38
3.4.2.2. Uniqueness of ID 38
3.4.2.3. Reporting false information 39
3.4.2.4. Not sending attestation message 40
3.4.3. Communication overhead 40
3.5. Extended Approach (EA) 42
3.5.1. Tree construction phase 43
3.5.2. Tree post-processing phase 46
3.5.3. Query dissemination phase 47
3.5.4. Aggregation phase 47
3.5.5. Attestation phase 49
3.5.6. Testification phase 50
3.6. Detecting the injected false aggregated value 51
3.6.1. Checking consistency 51
3.6.2. Finding the outlier 53
3.7. Security in the aggregation phase 54
3.8. Security in the attestation phase 56
3.8.1. False information in the attestation message 56
3.8.2. Not sending an attestation message 57
3.9. Security in the testification phase 57
3.9.1. Not reporting a missing aggregation value 57
3.9.2. Framing a child 58
3.10. Communication overhead 58
3.10.1. Overhead in the tree construction phase 59
3.10.2. Overhead in the tree post-processing phase 59
3.10.3. Overhead in the attestation phase 60
3.10.4. Overhead in the testification phase 61
3.11. Simulation results of EA 61
3.11.1. An example of an aggregation tree and an attestation tree 62
3.11.2. Properties of the aggregation tree 62
3.11.2.1. Connectivity of the aggregation tree 62
3.11.2.2. Percentage of non-aggregating nodes 63
3.11.3. Communication overhead in the attestation phase 63
3.11.4. Energy consumption 64
3.11.4.1. Energy overhead 66
3.11.4.2. Wasted energy between EA and SDAP [69] 66
3.11.5. Comparison with existing work 67
3.12. Conclusion 69
4. Energy-Efficient and Secure Data Aggregation Protocols 71
4.1. Efficient Energy Approach (EEA) 71
4.1.1. Related work of EEA 72
4.1.2. Assumptions of EEA 74
4.1.2.1. Network topology 74
4.1.2.2. Unique keys and pair-wise keys 74
4.1.2.3. Attacker model 74
4.1.3. Proposed protocol of EEA 76
4.1.4. Simulation of EEA 77
4.1.4.1. Network environment 78
4.1.4.2. The model of energy per bit 78
4.1.4.3. Energy consumption for attack detection 79
4.1.5. Discussion of EEA 82
4.2. Efficient Energy and Security Approach (EESA) 83
4.2.1. Related work of EESA 85
4.2.2. Assumption of EESA 86
4.2.2.1. Network model 86
4.2.2.2. Pair-wise keys and group keys 87
4.2.3. Proposed protocol of EESA 88
4.2.4. Simulation of EESA 90
4.2.4.1. Network environment 90
4.2.4.2. Energy consumption 90
4.2.5. Discussion of EESA 92
5. Conclusion and future work 95
Reference 96